This article examines the historical lineages and colonial logics underpinning humanitarian officials’ misconduct and the justifications for their actions whilst deployed to the UN peacekeeping mission Opération des Nations Unies au Congo or ONUC, (1960-1964). Using analysis of oral testimonies, UN video footage, personal papers, and newspaper articles, it pieces together a fragmentary history of humanitarian officials’ conduct on the ground and draws attention to the colonial continuities in Western humanitarian practice during decolonisation. Focusing on instances of field-based transgression by international officials deployed during the ‘Congo Crisis’, I trace how Western paternalism, humanitarian bravado, and racial stereotypes of the Congolese population provided motivation for misconduct as well as justidying harm and abuse. The normalisation of imperial morality in the field served to minimised officials’ understanding of their wrongdoing. I interrogate the colonial logic that European administrators believed that it would be ‘impossible’ for them to uphold the same standards of ‘civilised’ behaviour as in their home country. Exacerbating this logic further, humanitarian officials benefited from the belief that they had ‘sacrificed’ themselves for the cause through their deployment, thus providing even greater justification for improvising in the field. By tracing civilisational logic from its origins in liberal colonial governance, this article uncovers how UN staffing decisions shaped a mission strategy of anti-bureaucratism and ‘cutting through the red tape’ on the ground; the UN leadership created a permissive environment for experimentation and improvised utilitarian ‘problem-solving’ under the guise of intense humanitarian pressure. Racialised anxieties about Congolese criminality further compounded officials’ anti-bureaucratism, provoking a mistrustful vigilance against the same population that they were deployed to protect.