African Socialism and the Limits of Global Familyhood: Tanzania and the New International Economic Order in Sub-Saharan Africa

In November 1963, Julius Nyerere, president of the newly independent East African country of Tanganyika, delivered a stirring speech to open a conference of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in Rome. He began by commending the rise of an “almost world-wide recognition of the common humanity of man, and a growing sense of human brotherhood,” affirming that “the existence of the FAO is indeed one of the expressions of this feeling of involvement in each other’s welfare.” Yet Nyerere’s speech quickly departed from this sanguine language of global fraternity and mutual concern as he turned to the subject of economic development. “Economically there are still two worlds, not one,” he declared. Decolonization was giving rise to “an atmosphere of ever rising expectations among the poor of the world,” but “the gap between the haves and the have-nots of the world” was “widening on a progressive scale.” At the heart of the problem, he insisted, was the nature of the international political and economic order itself, with its philosophical basis in “multilateral free trade theory” and attendant disregard of the pronounced hierarchies ordering the community of supposedly equal nations. To correct the growing trend of developmental divergence and achieve basic economic justice for underdeveloped countries like Tanganyika, Nyerere asserted that isolated commodity agreements and occasional disbursements of aid were insufficient; a “World Economic Development Plan” was essential. “The FAO must either have the power to plan world food and agriculture, both production and marketing, or it will remain what it is now; a charity organization,” he concluded incisively.

Nyerere’s speech simultaneously highlighted both the importance and irrelevance of international development organizations in their existing form, eschewed technical discussions about agricultural modernization in favor of explicit reckoning with global inequalities, and argued that atomized policy prescriptions for national development could not succeed without countering the forces of uneven development inherent in the ideologies and practices regulating the world economy as a whole. In doing so, it invoked two contrasting (although not mutually exclusive) models for conceptualizing the global community: a humanistic, harmonious vision of transnational familyhood structured by the principle of mutual obligation, on the one hand, and a more confrontational, Marxist-inflected image of a world increasingly divided—along national lines—into the two polarized groups of profiteers and the poor, on the other. These paradigms alternately animated Third World activism on a global scale during
the mid-to-late twentieth century, variously translating into calls for increased solidarity or unity and demands for substantive structural reforms.

Temporally positioned at a midpoint between what scholars have taken to identifying as the bookends of the Third World movement—the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference of 1955 and the New International Economic Order (NIEO) call of 1973—Nyerere’s 1963 lecture serves as a useful point of departure for an examination of the roots of the NIEO, particularly given the broad resonance of his bid for a “World Economic Development Plan” with the G-77’s later proposal. Returning to this earlier moment helps illuminate the broader dynamics of Third World activism as it transitioned from its Bandung-era incarnation—emphasizing cultural or racial bonds and promoting cooperation (in very general terms) among participating countries—to its NIEO one—joining these same players in the formal institutional setting of the United Nations to stage precise, concrete economic and legal demands on what they referred to as the global north. More specifically, it helps account for how and why specific forms of activism became imaginable, compelling, and impossible at particular stages of this trajectory.

Revisiting Nyerere’s 1963 address also serves as an important reminder that the NIEO was not “of marginal relevance” to sub-Saharan countries, and neither was sub-Saharan Africa a marginal player in the making of this movement. Indeed, many of the issues that the NIEO raised were of central concern to leaders of left-leaning African countries that emerged from colonial rule in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These included the vulnerabilities of primary product exporters to the tumultuous price fluctuations of international markets, the arbitrariness of preferential trade arrangements and the undemocratic character of GATT institutions and norms, the tendency of conditions attached to foreign aid and investment to further compromise the political autonomy and economic capacity of poor countries, and the enduring legacies of colonialism manifested in a variety of forms. In some ways the FAO meeting was an especially appropriate venue for an African leader to voice these anxieties; after the euphoria of independence settled, many sub-Saharan African countries found themselves unable even to provide a steady supply of adequate food to their citizens. Though the challenges of underdevelopment were especially acute in Africa, however, leaders like Nyerere recognized them as consistent with a condition common to a wider Third World or global south.

Nonetheless, in 1963 Nyerere’s vision for the creation of a “World Economic Development Plan” still seemed a remote fantasy. The Tanganyikan president himself acknowledged that perhaps his proposal was “not realistic.” In the absence of truly global structural reform, he suggested, the only possible path to meaningful development for Third World countries lay in consolidating “their unity against the rich” in “a separate economic unit”—through a system of concerted planning, managed credit, trade linkages, and mutual assistance. On a global scale, this concept of elective but institutionalized transnational cooperation resonated with the political mission of organizations such as the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization and the Non-Aligned Movement, both of which held meetings in Tanzania in the 1960s and early 1970s. On a continental scale, Pan-Africanist efforts sought to more concretely bolster
the economic prospects of isolated national units by subsuming them within inte-
grated regional federations. In turn, these varied projects of internationalist or
transnational engagement were premised upon maintaining the internal unity of
constituent national participants, which could hardly be taken for granted amid the
volatile context of Cold War competition, covert foreign intervention, intensifying
liberation struggles, and disputes over resources raging across sub-Saharan Africa at
the time. Radical African countries responded to these real or potential threats to
national stability by adopting domestic programs of African socialism; the Tanzanian
version was conceptually anchored by the principles of mutual assistance—rendered
as “familyhood”—and self-reliance—variously configured to mean autonomy or
autarky. The contradictions that resulted from amalgamating these two apparently
opposed ethics captured the broader tensions of efforts at Third Worldist organizing
during the 1960s and 1970s.

This essay contextualizes the emergence of the NIEO—as an ideological formation
and political project—from the particular vantage point of early postcolonial Tanzania,
beginning with the early 1960s moment of Nyerere’s FAO speech. In doing so, it aims
both to help write sub-Saharan Africa into the newly emerging history of the NIEO and
to open up more established histories of early postcolonial Africa to the dynamic global
contests over the international order in which they were embedded. A close evaluation
of the Tanzanian case illuminates some of the primary contours and contradictions of
the larger transition from the Bandung to NIEO versions of the Third World movement
from a perspective that a panoramic global view on this process cannot capture.

Tanzania came to be one of the most vocal sub-Saharan African proponents of the
NIEO and maintained the most sustained commitment to nonaligned and anti-
colonial internationalism, Pan-Africanism, and African socialism among its
continental counterparts throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Yet, by the mid-1970s,
Tanzania was the recipient of more foreign aid than any of its African
neighbors—much of it from the very western or northern countries whose exploitative
practices Nyerere critiqued—and its Pan-Africanist and socialist efforts were floun-
dering. This condition belied the broader dilemmas of Third World strategizing
during this era. As Tanzanian leaders experimented with various political and
economic initiatives to improve their country’s position in the world, they struggled
to reconcile the imperatives of national independence and transnational interdepen-
dence, democracy and equality, and confidence in human agency and consciousness
of structural constraints. Many of these tensions and ambivalences were woven into
the institutional makeup and ideological foundations of the international order itself,
which at once enabled and crippled the NIEO.

By the mid-1970s, the terms of the balance between the Third World’s emphasis on
transnational unity and its desire for substantive economic and political sovereignty
had shifted from its earlier configuration in the previous decade. National borders had
become fixed, concerns about underdevelopment had yielded to a concerted push for
the reorganization of the world system and not just the internal reconfiguration of
individual national units, and discussions of human rights came to center on issues of
collective economic justice. In order to make sense of this transition, it is critical to
dismantle three binaries that have dominated analyses of the mid-to late twentieth-century world, which Tanzania’s early postcolonial trajectory challenges in especially visible ways. The first is the opposition of subordinated colonial status with that of independent nationhood.

Although decolonization ultimately produced an assortment of new nation-states, this outcome was not actually conclusive until the late 1960s. In 1960, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which went on to become the country’s ruling political party, offered to “postpone the celebration of Tanganyika’s independence,” which was then scheduled for the following year, to “celebrate East Africa’s independence in 1962 rather than take the risk of perpetuating the balkanization of East Africa.”11 Nyerere and his TANU allies, in other words, pushed for self-determination to take the shape of a transnational federation rather than narrow national statehood, believing that the former offered greater geopolitical and economic security for the constituent colonies of British East Africa.12 Although this initial effort failed, with Tanganyika becoming an independent nation-state in late 1961, talks for a postindependence federation continued. In the summer of 1963, East African leaders signed a declaration agreeing to establish a federation by the end of the year, specifying “economic planning, the maximum establishment of manpower and our other resources, the establishment of a central bank and common defence programme, and foreign and diplomatic representation,” as sectors of future joint action.13 Within months, it had become clear that “major difficulties” had arisen in negotiations;14 eventually, the Ugandan leader Milton Obote pulled out of the talks. Alternatively, Nyerere looked to the possibility of a Tanganyika-Kenya federation and even spoke of including Nyasaland and the Rhodesias.15 However, after that December, when Kenya moved ahead with its national independence, the region’s countries would henceforth advance the ideal of unity “not as a block but as partners.”16

Despite its ultimate breakdown, the movement for an East African Federation reveals a more fluid and indeterminate picture of political imagination in decolonization-era Africa than is conventionally depicted.17 Independent nationhood in the threatening, unequal global order was a hard-won prize but inspired considerable anxiety; so did the prospect of compromising national autonomy within a transnational political community—even one composed of similarly disadvantaged members. Presiding over a largely agrarian country oriented overwhelmingly toward the export of raw materials such as sisal, coffee, and cotton, Nyerere recognized that on its own, Tanzania would be “helpless in the world market.”18 Yet Kenya’s relatively more robust development prospects rendered its leaders wary of tying themselves to their poorer neighbor. Meanwhile, Nyerere’s vocal promotion of African socialism (starting in 1962) raised further suspicions among his less radical counterparts. On a microcosmic level, these divisions represented the same obstacles to cultivating Third World unity that G-77 members confronted some ten years later—namely, uneven development, ideological divergences, and the shared vulnerabilities that both propelled and constrained transnational cooperation.

Though Tanganyika successfully merged with Zanzibar in 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania, in the absence of a concerted commitment to Pan-African integration that could mitigate direct exposure to the world economy, TANU
embraced a domestic program of African socialism beginning in 1967. African socialism was neither a camouflaged variant of capitalism nor a crude derivative of socialism; this Cold War binary, a projection that lingers in much historical scholarship today, obscures the wide range of developmental ideologies circulating in the Third World at the time. Though the NIEO reflected the influence of leftist intellectual production during the 1960s and early 1970s—particularly in the area of dependency or underdevelopment theory—it sought to engage with and transform the existing capitalist global order, rather than thoroughly overturn it with a socialist system. This position was consistent with, and emerged from, creative efforts to combine socialist and capitalist ideology when formulating national development programs.

On the African continent, a loose continental repertoire of African socialism overlapped with Pan-Africanist concepts and networks. It blended various developmental models into a distinctive hybrid characterized by its rhetorical embrace of traditional African culture, bid for economic equality but rejection of class struggle, and humanistic censure of exploitation (often described as parasitism). Guinea, Ghana, and Mali, among others, adopted programs of African socialism in the 1960s. In 1967, Nyerere inaugurated a Tanzanian variant termed *ujamaa*, or “familyhood” in Swahili. This event was marked by a wave of government nationalizations and policies encouraging the nationwide formation of communal villages, instituting universal access to education and health care, and mandating against the individual accumulation of wealth. To use a developmental lexicon popularized by the International Labor Organization one decade later, from 1967 onward, Tanzania’s agrarian-oriented socialism foregrounded the “basic needs” of individual citizens over the seductive logic of aggregate growth.

*Ujamaa* discourse also held up the romanticized (that is, nonhierarchical) traditional African extended family as a metaphor for political community. On a global stage, Nyerere deployed the language of international kinship to underwrite appeals to a common humanity in support of both calls for global economic reform and proposals for Pan-Africanist or Third World unity. In his first statement of *ujamaa* philosophy in 1962, he outlined a moral case for transcending national divisions, insisting that “our recognition of the family to which we all belong must be extended yet further—beyond the tribe, the community, the nation, or even the continent—to embrace the whole society of mankind.” This was “the only logical conclusion for true socialism.” Given the actual persistence of a “national order of things” in which African countries held the status of second-class citizenship, however, Nyerere and his TANU colleagues became increasingly preoccupied with protecting whatever fragile scraps of sovereignty Tanzania did possess—from within as well as without. Internally, the TANU-led government harnessed the ideal of socialist familyhood to underscore the imperative of domestic consensus, which legitimated the one-party state’s outlawing of autonomous labor unions and suppression of political dissent. In particular, Nyerere’s regime—like Kwame Nkrumah’s in Ghana and Ahmed Sékou Touré’s in Guinea—silenced internal critics who demanded a more “scientific” application of doctrinaire socialism to address the capitalist dynamics they believed had taken root in African soil.
By the late 1970s, however, Nyerere was urging the global south to come together as “a trade union for the poor”—mobilizing the very language of class struggle internationally that he had been so reluctant to countenance domestically.26 Whereas earlier Nyerere had encouraged Third World countries to delink from the world economy to achieve collective self-reliance, in the 1970s he began calling on the south to intensify its engagement with the north by articulating concerted material demands on the latter. If necessary, he explained, “we may be forced to call a strike in order to show that certain things are no longer acceptable!”27 This shift reflected the dire circumstances in which most African countries found themselves by the mid-1970s, no matter what shape their domestic policy agendas had taken in the preceding years. In the Tanzanian case, not only had the expansive prospect of Pan-African federation faltered but so had the ujamaa project that followed. Whereas ujamaa ideology optimistically posited that hard work and a spirit of mutual assistance alone could lead to development, at a Tanzania-based G-77 meeting in 1979 a disillusioned Nyerere reflected, “We all”—meaning the world’s developing nations in general—“discovered that hard work and prosperity were not cause and effect; something external to ourselves always seemed to break the reputed connection.”28 In pursuit of nonaligned diversification instead of autarky, Tanzania’s foreign economic relations had diminished rather than bolstered the country’s autonomy. High rates of debt compounded a shortage of domestic skilled workers and a precipitous drop in domestic agricultural production when the centerpiece of the ujamaa initiative, a campaign for rural villagization, became compulsory in 1973, disrupting agricultural labor and environmental conditions in the countryside.29 Though many in sub-Saharan Africa viewed the OPEC oil embargo of that same year as a flash of hope amid otherwise darkening economic prospects, African countries were among the worst affected by the skyrocketing of oil prices and concomitant global recession. Within a few years, Tanzania had essentially abandoned its course of agrarian socialism, as the limits of national development had become all too clear.

Throughout the 1970s, as Nyerere participated in and increasingly led calls for a NIEO, he alternated between asserting the moral responsibility of the global north to its poorer relations and urging countries in the global south to come together to materially force the hand of their wealthier exploiters. The former position overlapped with and strategically drew upon the language of global human rights, even though it also emerged from a conception of political ethics anchored in African socialist thought and forged through anticolonial activism. In implicitly or explicitly adopting human rights discourse, Nyerere did not choose between upholding individual rights and enshrining group rights—another commonly supposed but false binary. Rather, he invoked a combination of both, depending on the type of rights in question and the scale of their application. Thus the NIEO grew out of a radical human rights tradition rooted in Third World anticolonial activism, predating the atomizing, depoliticizing movement for individual human rights that emerged most strikingly in the global north in the NIEO’s aftermath.30

Human rights talk had a longer history in the region, but its character and function evolved over time. During the 1950s, anticolonial activists in Tanganyika—a UN Trust Territory—sent thousands of petitions to the UN, demanding equal access
to the “principles promising self-determination, an end to racial discrimination, and social and economic equality” outlined in the UN Charter. At this time, too, TANU followed Nkrumah’s example in rejecting violence as a tactic in liberation struggle, prioritizing the sanctity of individual life consistent with what would soon become a largely Western-based human rights movement. From 1960 onward, however, as continental conditions shifted, Tanzania transitioned from passive, peaceful support of anticolonial movements in proximate lusophone and southern African territories—a “withdrawing of support,” as in the South African boycott of 1959—into active engagement and support for armed struggle. Tanzania headed the Organization of African Unity’s Liberation Committee and hosted, supplied, and trained a range of freedom fighters. These activities threatened to invite unwelcome foreign invasion by imperial or anticommunist parties, a fear that increasingly pervaded Tanzania’s political culture and drove undemocratic practices such as preventative detention. Accordingly, even while Tanzanian leaders frequently used the UN as a platform to decry all types of human rights abuses in external sites, such as Rhodesia, they resisted attempts by Western organizations to police the suppression of civil liberties and compromise of political rights in Tanzania itself. These efforts were perceived as a neocolonial violation of Tanzania’s own national sovereignty and a threat to its efforts to secure this same status for the rest of the African continent.

On the whole, Nyerere and his TANU colleagues foregrounded the collective rights of political self-determination and economic sovereignty in their international advocacy—with regard to both cases of ongoing formal colonialism or white minority rule and independent African countries that had not yet wrestled free from what were widely discussed as neocolonial ties. On the anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a 1967 editorial in the TANU-run newspaper The Nationalist declared, “Human Rights are to date still being trampled upon in many countries of the world.” It asserted that on the one hand, “millions of Africans are still denied the right to self-determination,” and on the other, “millions of people are also denied their rights to full development due to economic exploitation inflicted upon them by so called rich nations of the world.” For Nyerere, however, national sovereignty—whether in legalistic or more substantive developmental terms—was a means to an end, and individual rights—particularly economic and social rights—still mattered. He demonstrated this by defying the OAU’s position on the Biafran war in late 1960s Nigeria to become the first African country to recognize the secessionist republic of Biafra, condemning the Nigerian government’s tactic of “bombing [Biafrans] into submission” even if it meant “giving formal recognition to even greater disunity in Africa.” Similarly, in practice and not just theory, he prioritized economic equality within Tanzanian borders—the protection of individual citizens from exploitation by others—over the advancement of the country’s global economic standing as a whole.

The conviction of the individual and collective right to material welfare implicit in African socialist thought infused Nyerere’s advocacy for international reform during the NIEO era. African socialism, though a varied ideology, was distinguished by its “comprehensive local moral vocabulary,” in which “exploitation was thus understood as a moral fault rather than as an aspect of a mode of production or an economic structure,” and “the social meaning of production and accumulation” as well as
exchange and consumption, was always foregrounded.41 This approach overlapped with aspects of international socialist and human rights discourse but was hardly reducible to either. Whereas northern opponents of the NIEO tended to resort to the abstract, technically calibrated language of “scientific capitalism,”42 Nyerere was part of a contingent of the global south that aimed to restore discussions about the world economy to an explicitly ethical, humanist realm. To achieve this, he often metaphorically rendered international relations as interpersonal ones, speaking of underdeveloped nations as mistreated individuals who deserved not only the right to concrete items like food and shelter but also the fundamental dignity of not being “forced into the position of beggars.”43 This was similar but not equivalent to the comparatively decontextualized, depoliticized morality of the “basic needs” approach adopted by what one scholar calls the “neo-functionalist” approach to international economic reform in the 1970s.44 Though a strong critic of narrow nationalism, Nyerere was all too aware that borders mattered and thus that combating the nation-based divisions of the international order was essential for protecting individuals within nations. Simply calling for a global Keynesianism, as the Brandt Commission did, was insufficient to the task. To many African activists, the commission’s language of mutual economic interest likely invited comparison to late colonialism’s reference to an agenda of mutual development.45 Structural overhaul alone would guarantee poorer postcolonial countries substantive liberation at last—through a kind of decolonization of the world system as a whole.

In a sense, there was no single NIEO movement, just as there was no one monolithic coalition for or conception of Pan-Africanism, African socialism, or human rights. There was, of course, a single concrete document that outlined the principles of a new global economic framework, including fairer trade, resource and technology transfer, national sovereignty in economic decision-making, and stabilized, remunerative prices for primary commodities. Translating the General Assembly’s 1974 ratification of these guidelines into an actual transformation of the status quo, however, would require more sustained organizing. NIEO advocates spoke of their cause in different idioms and with different agendas; these could and did evolve between the proposal’s initial germination at the 1973 meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers and the rapid ascendance of a new neoliberal paradigm in the early 1980s.46 Over time it became clear that the viability of the south’s movement depended on not merely the “political will” of the north but also that of its own members; the global south was a construction that required constant labor to authenticate. In this effort, numerous statistics could be mobilized to illustrate staggering inequalities of wealth across a single global divide; for instance, in 1970, the minority of the world’s population living in the northern hemisphere held 84 percent of the global share of GDP versus the southern majority’s 16 percent. However, after the oil price hikes of 1973 and 1979, another fracture began to manifest itself within the south itself.47 By 1974, OPEC countries’ share of world export profits had jumped from 5.6 percent in 1970 to 15 percent, more than that of the rest of the Third World combined.48 Other “locomotives of the South” in Asia followed developmental paths that were also increasingly diverging from those of their African counterparts, while Latin American countries
struggled with the particular challenges of pervasive U.S. economic entanglement and political intervention.⁴⁹

As the African experience showed, meaningful transnational partnerships were often so difficult to cultivate precisely because of the same constraints on national sovereignty that motivated such solidarity. Though the Cold War friction of the 1960s had somewhat abated by the mid-1970s, opening up new space for global engagement, internal cleavages continued to plague the cause of G-77 unity.⁵⁰ Even within individual African states, unity remained elusive; waves of coup d'états began sweeping the continent shortly after decolonization, removing African socialist pioneers Nkrumah and Modibo Keita, among others, from power by the end of the 1960s.

Tanzania’s foreign affairs minister described the coup d'état phenomenon as evidence of colonialism’s enduring ability to divide and rule, suggesting that in this light, all Africans were “still freedom fighters struggling to achieve true independence.”⁵¹ While formal anticolonial struggles provided common cause for other coalitions, even liberation movements themselves suffered from rancorous divisions, exacerbated by the patronage contests associated with Cold War competition between and within capitalist and socialist blocs.⁵² But the challenge of unity became still more daunting when it sought to transcend racial, religious, ideological, geographic, economic, and national distinctions in the name of global justice. In 1979, Nyerere admitted to members of the G-77 that “ours is a unity of opposition” and “a unity of nationalisms,” stating that “it was our separate nationalisms which caused us to come together, not the ideals of human brotherhood, or human equality, or love for each other.”⁵³ The limits of a discourse of transnational fraternity had been exposed; the common denominator of the fragile southern coalition had been reduced to national self-interest alone.

Yet it was no small task to convince OPEC countries, in particular, that their national self-interest lay in economic alliances with their poorer, more vulnerable neighbors to the south, rather than aspirational identification with their more powerful clients to the north. From the perspective of many sub-Saharan African countries, the stabilization of commodity prices was an urgent priority—both to ensure a minimum income for farmers and to place caps on food imports (which in the 1970s were rising in proportion to exports across the African continent).⁵⁴ Such a policy would be realizable only if all primary commodities were negotiated collectively, linking the price of products such as cashews and rice to that of oil. In this respect the success of the NIEO hinged upon the cooperation of OPEC countries. African socialist regimes’ substantial ties to North African radicals such as Algeria and Egypt in support of leftist freedom fighters, as well as their connections to Israel in the early 1960s, strained relations with more conservative oil-producing states in the Middle East.⁵⁵ In East Africa, moreover, the massacres and ensuing exodus of Arab-descended residents of Zanzibar during and after the 1964 revolution further underlined that when it entered the matrix of national or local politics, the Afro-Asian solidarity celebrated at Bandung was difficult to sustain.⁵⁶ However, such cultural and political concerns ultimately paled in the face of sheer economic self-interest. In the mid-to-late 1970s, even while Tanzanian officials anticipated promised aid from and improved trade with OPEC countries, imagining their country’s conversion into East Africa’s
primary oil-processing and distribution hub, OPEC countries refused to accommodate the dire financial situations of their African buyers and devoted relatively little surplus profit to industrial development in the broader global south.57 Even the overtures of oil-rich African countries seeking to benefit from OPEC’s technopolitical savvy were rejected.58 Across the continent, disappointment reigned.

The broad narrative of sub-Saharan Africa’s course in the wake of the NIEO’s eclipse and the ascendance of the Washington Consensus in the 1980s is already well known. After the second oil price hike in 1979, the prices of basic commodities plummeted, creating an untenable situation for countries already drowning in debt that was rapidly compounding under high interest rates. Within several years, the heated, insistently politicizing debates on global inequality of the 1970s would cede to the dry technical calculations of World Bank and IMF bureaucrats, who rhetorically reduced the economic troubles of Third World countries to evidence of internal mismanagement, neatly excising historical and international factors from their assessment. Of course, the ensuing interventions into Third World economies in the name of structural adjustment were morally charged in their own way; this was the selective, implicit ethical superiority of the powerful, who—in the name of good governance—dispensed with African citizens’ political rights to accountability and democracy by slashing the developmental capacities of African states at their moment of greatest weakness.59 The full history of structural adjustment has yet to be written, much like that of Third World responses to the neoliberal turn of the 1980s.60 In Tanzania, under pressure from the IMF, Nyerere presided over a domestic structural reform agenda in the early years of the decade and stepped down from the presidency in 1985, just before his successor signed an agreement with the IMF to undergo full adjustment. The following year, Nyerere became the head of the South-South Commission, a new institutional home for Third World cooperation on issues of development. Over time the South Commission, too, would find itself an increasingly fractured and marginalized voice on the global stage.

The push for a NIEO had roots in older debates, desires, and dilemmas for many of its African participants. Just as the 1970s movement for global economic justice is not reducible to a stable, monolithic formation, neither are sub-Saharan African experiences of the early postcolonial era easily understood within the framework of conventional analytical categories retroactively grafted onto this context. The political imagination of Tanzanian leaders was never imprisoned within binaries opposing formal colonialism to independent nationhood, capitalism to socialism, or individual rights to collective rights. Grasping this conceptual fluidity—which was hardly exclusive to the Tanzanian case—is essential to understanding the broader character of the evolving Third World movement from which the NIEO eventually emerged and the complex nature of the NIEO itself. Moving among, between, and within these discursive and material poles, Nyerere and other leftist African leaders forged a variety of political languages, agendas, and policies in response to a shared set of obstacles to what increasingly seemed to be the interlinked goals of economic sovereignty and development.

The first chapter of these efforts took the shape of movements at transnational
federation in the name of Pan-Africanism, which were designed to enhance the possibility of collective self-reliance by expanding its scale. By the mid-1960s, Nyerere turned away from the project of East African federation, which had crumbled in the face of prematurely entrenched national subjectivities, and took up a domestic program of *ujamaa* socialism. Within a few years, however, the limits of this nationally enclosed utopian project had likewise become glaringly apparent. As this second chapter of radical developmental activism was closing, so was a third opening; in the mid-to-late 1970s Tanzania joined other G-77 members to actively engage the global north in demands for a reconfiguration of the ideologies, institutions, and regulations governing the world economy. Though Nyerere had perceived the necessity of such a “World Economic Development Plan” some ten years earlier, it was only after other alternatives had been exhausted that such a course of action became viable on a global scale. Yet it would take considerable labor to mobilize the political will to materialize a NIEO. To this end, Nyerere harnessed the lexicon of international human rights, linking individual social and economic rights to collective political sovereignty, as well as invoked the concept of self-determination, insisting that “economic domination should be politically perceived” to “push the process of liberation to its logical conclusion.” He also drew upon a distinctive language of African socialism, strategically summoning *ujamaa*’s romanticized version of the traditional African extended family to underscore the mutual obligations of wealthy countries in the global north to their southern counterparts. Ultimately, however, this metaphor of transnational kinship proved inadequate to the task of cultivating the unity of a southern bloc, which had run aground on the very national divisions whose fragility the NIEO movement had sought to combat in the first place.

**NOTES**


5. Nyerere, Memorial Lecture.


7. In particular, with regard to Tanzanian historiography, taking the NIEO and related 1970s global debates seriously complicates a common periodization splitting the postcolonial period into two halves—a socialist (1960s–70s) and postsocialist (1980s onward) one. See, for example, a recent special issue on “Tanzania at 50”: *Review of African Political Economy* 39, no. 131 (2012). More
broadly, emphasizing the NIEO as an extension of earlier Third World organizing begun at Bandung (1955) and the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (1961) and the G-77 (1964) allows for a revised periodization of this global dynamic that is more inclusive of African actors, given their later timeline of decolonization.


11. Julius Nyerere, “East African Federation,” in *Freedom and Unity*. This speech was published as a pamphlet by the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) after the organization approved the proposal for a federation in Uganda in October 1960.


16. UKNA, FO 371/167147, Milton Obote, President’s speech to the National Assembly on November 4, 1963.


of development I am not suggesting that African socialism can be subsumed under a single monolithic category of generic “developmentalism,” which has become an increasingly fashionable analytical label in recent years. See Priya Lal, “Self-Reliance and the State: The Multiple Meanings of Development in Early Post-Colonial Africa,” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 82, no. 2 (May 2012): 212–34.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. These problems were compounded by a simultaneous regional drought. For more on villagization’s local and national implementation and implications, see Priya Lal, “Between the Village and the World: Imagining and Practicing Development in Tanzania, 1964–75” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 2011).


34. Liberation movements from Mozambique, Rhodesia, South Africa, Angola, and Namibia operated out of Tanzania. This work tied Tanzania to a variety of socialist and radical Third World countries, including Cuba, China, the USSR, East Germany, Algeria, and Egypt; it also entailed closer relations with some Western-based humanitarian agencies, radical African American groups, and others.

35. The example of the Congo inspired considerable anxiety in other radical African leaders, as did the Portuguese army’s 1970 operation to assassinate the Guinean leader Ahmed Sékou Touré in Conakry, in retaliation for Guinea’s support for the PAIGC’s liberation struggle. In Tanzania, a series of Portuguese attacks across the Mozambican border during the 1960s, the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane by parcel bomb in Dar es Salaam in 1969, and series of mysterious bombings in Dar es Salaam in 1972 rumored to be the work of South African agents heightened fears of covert intervention to destabilize the TANU regime.

36. This was particularly exemplified in the increasing application of Tanzania’s Preventative Detention Act, modeled after similar legislation in Ghana. See Terretta, “From Below and to the Left?”


40. In 1967 TANU enshrined a Leadership Code that limited the wages and property of party elites; *njamaa* also configured accumulation by exploitation by the wider population as a central violation of its moral code. Nyerere was the most outspoken proponent of agrarian-centered development among his African socialist counterparts.


42. Ibid.


50. Yet there were significant late-stage Cold War resurgences, as documented in Sue Onslow, ed., *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation* (New York: Routledge, 2009), among others.

51. UKNA, FCO 31/968, Speech by the Minister of State, Foreign Affairs to the National Assembly on July 21, 1971, when presenting estimates for the year 1971–72.


55. For an overview of Israeli-African ties, see Joel Peters, *Israel and Africa* (London: British Academic Press, 1992). In general, the early ties of African socialist states to Israel in the fields of military and developmental aid were severed after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; after this point, Tanzanian officials referred to Israelis as colonial occupiers.


58. Gabrielle Hecht, *Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012). Hecht treats the case of Gabon in particular; her discussion of technopolitical dimensions of Africa’s position with the international nuclear order has important parallels to Africa’s position within the international oil economy.

59. As James Ferguson writes, “The promise of democracy has been held out to African publics just at the moment in history when key matters of macroeconomic policy were taken out of the hands of African state.” Ferguson, *Global Shadows*, 12.
